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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 The State charged Mr. Longhofer with operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol (second felony within fifteen years).  Mr. Longhofer filed a motion in 
limine to exclude the breath test results in this case.  The district court denied the 
motion in limine.  Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Longhofer agreed to 
plead guilty to the charge while reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion in 
limine.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three-and-one-
half years fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Longhofer asserts the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion in limine, because the State did not lay the 
necessary foundation to show the accuracy of the breath test results. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Officer Takeuchi with the Middleton Police Department stopped a car for traveling 
50 mph in a 35 mph zone.  (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)  The officer 
saw an open case of beer in the car, and identified the driver as Mr. Longhofer by his 
Idaho driver’s license.  (PSI, p.3.)  Officer Takeuchi noted Mr. Longhofer had eyes that 
appeared to be glossy and bloodshot, the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from 
his mouth, and slow and slurred speech.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Longhofer stated he thought 
the speed limit was 50 mph.  (PSI, p.3.)  When asked how much alcohol he had to 
drink, Mr. Longhofer reportedly stated, “I’ve had a couple, eh probably five.”  (PSI, p.3.)  
Mr. Longhofer failed the field sobriety tests administered by Officer Takeuchi.  (See PSI, 
p.3.)  He gave three breath test samples, with results of 0.114, INF (insufficient), and 
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0.116.  (See PSI, p.3.)  The officer placed Mr. Longhofer under arrest and took him to 
the Canyon County Jail.  (PSI, p.3.) 
 The State charged Mr. Longhofer by Information with operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol (second felony within fifteen years), felony, Idaho 
Code § 18-8004 and 18-8005.  (R., pp.19-22.)  Mr. Longhofer entered a not guilty plea.  
(R., pp.25-26.) 
 Mr. Longhofer subsequently filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude BAC Results, 
Memorandum in Support and Request for Hearing, followed by two amended motions in 
limine.  (R., pp.28-37, 44-55.)  In his second amended motion in limine, Mr. Longhofer 
requested an order “excluding the results of the BAC tests in this case, specifically the 
.114 and .116 readings, for reasons that the performance check on [the] Lifeloc BAC 
instrument utilized by law enforcement did not meet the standards as required in the 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure manual.”  (R., p.44.)  
Mr. Longhofer asserted the standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) required a 
performance verification of the Lifeloc breath test instrument within twenty-four hours 
before or after a test to approve the samples for evidentiary use.  (R., pp.45-46; see 
R., p.51 (SOP 5.1.3).)  The required performance verification was a pair of samples in 
sequence that are both within +/- 10% of the performance verification standard target 
value.  (R., p.46; see R., p.53 (SOP 5.1.5).)   The standard target value at issue here 
was 0.08, using a 0.08 solution.  (See R., p.55 (simulator solution log).) 
 The simulator solution log showed a verification check had been run within the 
twenty-four period after Mr. Longhofer’s test.  (R., p.46; see R., p.55.)  The verification 
check test results were 0.073 and 0.070.  (R., pp.46, 55.)  Mr. Longhofer asserted “[t]en 
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percent of .080 is .008, so the acceptable range for the test is .088 or .072.”  (R., p.46.)  
Mr. Longhofer continued:  “The second test result was .070, and this .10 [sic] exceeds 
the allowable 10% variance from .08 standard.  SOP 5.1.5 states that the pair of 
samples in sequence, ‘. . . are both within +/- 10% of the performance verification 
standard target value.’”   (R., p.46 (emphasis in original); see R., p.55.)  Mr. Longhofer 
asserted “[t]he language ‘must’ in the SOPs is mandatory.  The performance 
verifications achieving acceptable results were not obtained within the twenty-four hour 
period and the results cannot be used for evidentiary purposes.”  (R., p.46.) 
 The State filed an Objection to Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude BAC 
Results.  (R., pp.38-39.)  The State argued “the test results are still of evidentiary value,” 
and intended “to introduce expert testimony through Jeremy Johnston of Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services” at the motion in limine hearing “that the instrument in question 
was trending low, and any deviation would have been to the Defendant’s benefit, 
producing test results lower than the actual Breath Alcohol Content.”  (R., p.38.) 
 Mr. Longhofer filed a Response to State’s Objection to Defendant’s Motion in 
Limine.  (R., pp.59-62.)  He asserted the State, in view of Idaho Rule of Evidence 
901(a)(9), “cannot prove that the process produced an accurate result.”  (R., pp.59-60.)  
Mr. Longhofer repeated the assertion the SOPs had to be followed for the breath test 
results to be admissible.  (See R., p.60.)  He further asserted, “[t]he defendant’s right to 
due process of law would be violated if the state were allowed to present the 
inadmissible BACs to the jury and then argue that the readings would have been higher 
if the instrument had been working properly.”  (R., p.60.)  Without conceding the test 
results were admissible, Mr. Longhofer also asserted under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 
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that Mr. Johnston’s anticipated testimony “would unfairly prejudice the defendant, 
confuse the issues, and mislead the jury.”  (See R., p.60.)   
 At the hearing on the motion in limine, the parties stipulated, for purposes of the 
hearing, that the blows in the field were conducted properly and the performance 
verification within twenty-four hours of the test was not done according to the SOPs.  
(Tr., p.7, L.4 – p.8, L.9.)  Mr. Johnston then testified via video conference that he was 
board-certified and employed with the Idaho State Police forensic laboratory.  (Tr., p.9, 
L.2 – p.11, L.11; see R., p.63.)  Mr. Johnston calibrated and certified all the Lifeloc 
breath test instruments used in Idaho, and was in charge of writing the SOPs for breath 
alcohol testing.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.12-23.)  He testified the purpose of the twenty-four-hour 
performance verification was “to show that the calibration is still valid and accurate and 
that the instrument is providing accurate and precise results.”  (Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15.)   
 Mr. Johnston testified that the Lifeloc breath test instrument used here was a fuel 
cell instrument, “[a]nd as that fuel cell ages and if it dries out, then it becomes less 
responsive to alcohol that’s presented to it.”  (See Tr., p.15, L.23 – p.16, L.10.)  He 
further testified that he “would expect it to show consistent results.  And they would 
consistently drop over time.”  (Tr., p.16, L.21 – p.17, L.1.)  Mr. Johnston had reviewed 
the simulator solution log in this case, and stated “[a]n entry would be made on a log 
like this to support the accuracy and precision of the calibration within 24 hours of an 
evidentiary test.”  (Tr., p.17, L.5 – p.19, L.12.)  Law enforcement officers were required 
to document all of their performance verification checks.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.4-14.)   
 Mr. Johnston then testified the simulator solution log reflected a fuel cell drying 
out and consistently underreporting over time, and the log entries in the month before 
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the performance verification check at issue seemed to be results typical of an aging fuel 
cell.  (See Tr., p.23, L.16 – p.24, L.19.)  The second result from the check at issue was 
not within tolerances.  (Tr., p.25, Ls.5-8.)  Mr. Johnston testified “the only two instances 
that I could think that would lead to this would be the calibration degradation of the 
instrument or the solution degradation with excessive use over time.”  (Tr., p.26, Ls.4-7.)   
 Mr. Johnston testified the results here of 0.116, insufficient, and 0.114 told him 
“that the instrument was responding to alcohol and that the breath that was provided 
contained alcohol and that the two breaths that were provided to the instrument were 
consistent in concentration.”  (See Tr., p.27, Ls.6-22.)  When asked whether there was 
anything that would indicate “[t]hat the results in the field were actually below a .08 
level,” Mr. Johnston replied, “there’s no evidence to lead me to believe that the results 
given in the field are elevated.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.4-11.)  Mr. Longhofer objected “to 
relevance as far as this being under 08.  The only issue here in front of the court today 
is if the machine is working properly that day.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.12-14.)  The State argued 
for its relevance, and that “[t]he inquiry . . . is did it accurately give a breath sample we 
can rely on.  The only thing the State needs to prove is is it above .08.”  (Tr., p.29, 
Ls.15-20.)  The district court overruled the objection.  (Tr., p.29, L.21.) 
 Mr. Johnston testified “all of the evidence shows that the instrument appears to 
be underreporting and definitely not overreporting.  So those results given in the field, 
that they’re definitely not overreported.”  (Tr., p.30, Ls.6-9.)  The State asked 
Mr. Johnston if he was “confident to a reasonable scientific certainty that the breath 
measured was actually above the .08 level.”  (Tr., p.30, Ls.10-12.)  Mr. Longhofer 
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objected on grounds of relevance, but the district court overruled the objection.  
(Tr., p.30, Ls.13-14.)  Mr. Johnston then answered: “Yes, I am.”  (Tr., p.30, L.15.) 
 On cross-examination, Mr. Johnston testified the simulator solution log showed a 
downward trend, even though the log entries showed slightly higher results on some 
days.  (See Tr., p.30, L.23 – p.31, L.24.)  To his knowledge, Mr. Johnston had not 
recently looked at the Lifeloc instrument at issue, or tested it, for purposes of the 
hearing.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.7-11, p.51, Ls.8-10.)  Mr. Johnston testified, “I have not tested 
this specific bottle of solution after it was poured into the simulator, but I have tested the 
specific lot of solution that that bottle was produced from.”  (Tr., p.42, Ls.14-16.)  On 
redirect examination, Mr. Johnston testified, “[o]ver time, this instrument’s calibration is 
losing sensitivity, and it’s underreporting.”  (Tr., p.53, Ls.19-22.) 
 After Mr. Johnston’s testimony, Mr. Longhofer asserted the SOPs state “that both 
readings must be within the 10 percent plus or minus verification limits.”  (Tr., p.55, 
Ls.17-19.)  Mr. Longhofer asserted the State had not laid sufficient foundation under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 901, and under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 Mr. Johnston’s 
testimony would be confusing to the jury, a waste of time, and prejudicial.  (See 
Tr., p.55, L.20 – p.56, L.6.)  Mr. Longhofer also emphasized the simulator solution log’s 
“readings are all over the place.  And a big problem the State has here is we don’t know 
if it was a solution problem or a LifeLoc problem.  So either one of those could be.”  
(Tr., p.56, Ls.15-18.)  Mr. Longhofer also asserted, “the most important thing is 
[Mr. Johnston] didn’t test either one of these instruments or the solution. . . .  [W]e would 
argue that his testimony is just based on pure speculation.”  (Tr., p.57, Ls.6-11.) 
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 In response, the State argued most of the SOPs were not mandatory, and that if 
the SOPs were not followed, the State may bring in expert testimony to let the district 
court decide whether the evidence was admissible despite the failure to follow the 
SOPs.  (Tr., p.58, L.8 – p.59, L.10.)  The State highlighted Mr. Johnston’s testimony 
that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, the instrument would not have 
provided an inaccurate result to the extent Mr. Longhofer was under the 0.08 level at 
the time the blows were given.  (See Tr., p.59, Ls.11-19.)  The State argued the 
question was: “Is the result accurate enough to determine that the defendant was over 
.08? . . .  [T]he fact that the testimony and all the evidence shows that this instrument 
was underreporting over time indicates that it was accurate enough to get us to that 
threshold over the .08 level.”  (Tr., p.59, Ls.20 – p.60, L.2.)   
 In its following Order on Motion in Limine, the district court denied 
Mr. Longhofer’s motion in limine.  (R., pp.80-89.)  The district court noted, “[a]lthough 
Defendant is correct that the SOP was not followed in this instance (a fact that the 
Plaintiff does not dispute), the Idaho Court of Appeals was clear in [State v. Charan, 132 
Idaho 341, 343 (Ct. App. 1998)] that strict adherence to the SOP is not required in every 
case.”  (R., p.87.)  The district court wrote, “[a]s long as the state can lay proper 
foundation for the BAC results through their expert’s testimony, and this court finds that 
the expert’s testimony is persuasive, the BAC’s will not be excluded.”  (R., p.87.) 
 The district court then found “Mr. Johnston’s testimony persuasive.  There has 
been nothing presented to suggest that the breath instrument in question would have 
yielded higher than normal readings.”  (R., p.87.)  According to the district court, 
Mr. Johnston’s testimony “supports the conclusion that any issue with the device would 
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cause it to produce lower, not higher, readings, and would thus not prejudice 
Defendant.”  (R., p.87.)  The district court also discussed Mr. Johnston’s testimony “that 
he was confident to a reasonable scientific degree that the BAC’s in question were 
actually above the .08 level,” and found that conclusion “was based on substantial 
evidence.”  (R., p.87.)  The district court therefore determined Mr. Johnston’s testimony 
“provides a sufficient basis to allow the BAC evidence to be admitted at trial.”  (R., p.87.)  
Any departure from the SOPs by the police would go “to the weight of the BAC’s as 
evidence, not whether they are admissible.”  (R., p.87.) 
 Additionally, the district court rejected Mr. Johnston’s Idaho Rules of 
Evidence 901 and 403 arguments as unpersuasive.  (R., pp.87-88.)  Thus, the district 
court denied Mr. Longhofer’s motion in limine.  (R., p.88.) 
 The State then filed an Amended Information also charging Mr. Longhofer with a 
persistent violator sentencing enhancement under I.C. § 19-2514.  (R., pp.94-95.)  
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Longhofer subsequently agreed to plead 
guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (second felony 
within fifteen years), and the State agreed to dismiss the sentencing enhancement.  
(R., pp.96-112.)  Mr. Longhofer reserved the right to appeal the district court’s order 
denying his motion in limine.  (R., pp.97, 105-06.)  The district court accepted the guilty 
plea.  (R., p.100.) 
 The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three-and-one-
half years fixed.  (R., pp.128-29.)   Mr. Longhofer filed a Notice of Appeal timely from 
the district court’s Judgment and Commitment.  (R., pp.123-25.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Longhofer’s motion in limine 
to exclude the breath test results? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Longhofer’s Motion In 
Limine To Exclude The Breath Test Results 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Longhofer asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion in limine to exclude the breath test results, because the State did not lay the 
necessary foundation to show the accuracy of the test results.  As the State stipulated, 
the State did not comply with the administrative procedures for the breath test.  Thus, to 
admit the test results under the standards of the Idaho Court of Appeals, the State had 
to provide expert testimony on why the procedural defects did not affect the reliability of 
the test results in this particular case.  See State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734 (Ct. App. 
2011); State v. Charan, 132 Idaho 341 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 The district court in this case determined the testimony of the State’s expert, 
Mr. Johnston, “provides a sufficient basis to allow the BAC evidence to be admitted at 
trial.”  (R., p.87.)  The district court stated Mr. Johnston’s testimony supported the 
conclusion that any issue with the breath test instrument would cause it to produce 
lower, not higher, readings.  (R., p.87.)  The district court also relied on Mr. Johnston’s 
testimony “that he was confident to a reasonable scientific certainty that the BAC’s in 
question were actually above the .08 level.”  (R., p.87.)   
 However, Mr. Johnston failed to provide testimony on why the procedural defects 
did not affect the reliability of the breath test results in this particular case.  Instead, 
Mr. Johnston testified the breath test instrument here gave inaccurate results.  
Mr. Johnston’s testimony on Mr. Longhofer’s actual alcohol concentration was not 
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relevant to why the procedural defects did not affect the reliability of the test results 
here.  Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Longhofer’s 
motion in limine.  The State will be unable to prove the district court’s denial of the 
motion in limine is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine, so appellate 
courts review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine for abuse of 
discretion.  State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527 (2014).  Similarly, appellate courts 
review a district court’s conclusion that evidence is supported by proper foundation 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 276 (2003).  
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a 
multi-tiered inquiry into whether the district court:  (1) rightly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason.  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
 
C. The State Did Not Lay The Necessary Foundation To Show The Accuracy Of 
The Breath Test Results 
 
 Mr. Longhofer asserts the State did not lay the necessary foundation to show the 
accuracy of the breath test results.  The State did not comply with the administrative 
procedures or SOPs for the breath test, and the State’s expert failed to provide 
testimony on why the procedural defects did not affect the reliability of the test results in 
this particular case. 
 I.C. § 18-8004 currently provides that 
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an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be based upon a formula 
of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood, per 
two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine.  
Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining the 
alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated by the 
Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police 
under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by 
that department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state 
police.  Notwithstanding any other provisions of law or rule of court, the 
results of any test for alcohol concentration and records relating to 
calibration, approval, certification or quality control performed by a 
laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho state police or by any other 
method approved by the Idaho state police shall be admissible in any 
proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a witness to 
establish the reliability of the testing procedure for examination. 
 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
 Evidence must be authenticated before it may be admitted.  Pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 901, “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”  I.R.E. 901(a).  One 
example of authentication in Rule 901’s illustrative list is “[e]vidence describing a 
process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system 
produces an accurate result.”  I.R.E. 902(9).  The Idaho Court of Appeals has observed 
that “[t]he analog federal rule has been said to govern the authentication of data 
procedure by a machine, such as a radar gun or a breathalyzer.”  State v. Barber, 157 
Idaho 822, 824 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing 31 Wright & Gold, Federal Practice & Procedure 
152-53 (2000)).  The Court of Appeals in Barber therefore held, “where evidence is 
derived from testing with a mechanical or scientific device, the proper use and accuracy 
of the device in question generally must be established by the proponent in order to 
introduce the evidence at trial.”  Id. 
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 The district court discussed another decision by the Idaho Court of Appeals, 
State v. Charan, 132 Idaho 341 (Ct. App. 1998), during the hearing on the motion in 
limine and in its order denying the motion.  (Tr., p.61, L.23 – p.62, L.20; R., pp.86-87.)  
In Charan, the Court of Appeals held expert testimony regarding the reliability of a BAC 
test “presented an adequate foundation for its admission into evidence.”  Charan, 132 
Idaho at 343.  The Charan Court explained it had previously rejected the argument “that 
stringent adherence to the administrative agency’s directions for test procedures is the 
sine qua non for admission of tests governed by I.C. §18-8004(4).”  Id.  “Rather, we held 
that ‘to admit the test result the state must provide adequate foundation evidence 
consisting either of expert testimony or a showing that the test was administered in 
conformity with the applicable test procedure.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 
38 (Ct. App. 1988)) (emphasis in original). 
 The State’s expert in Charan testified that the breath alcohol test at issue, in his 
opinion, was accurate.  Id.  The test had not been administered in compliance with the 
required fifteen-minute observation period.  Id. at 342.  The expert testified that the 
observation period had initially been required to prevent inaccurate test results from the 
predecessor of the breath test device used in Charan, which could not detect the 
presence of mouth alcohol that could lead to an invalid sample.  Id.  Although the 
observation period was still required as an additional safeguard, the expert testified “it 
was not really necessary to ensure accurate tests from” the device used in Charan 
“because that instrument has a ‘negative slope indicator’ that detects when mouth 
alcohol is present and indicates that the breath sample is invalid.”  Id.  In the expert’s 
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opinion, because the negative slope indicator did not detect mouth alcohol in the breath 
samples at issue, the test was accurate.  Id.   
 The Charan Court held “the uncontroverted testimony of” the expert “in this case 
provided sufficient foundation for admission of the evidence.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  
The Charan Court also clarified that “[w]here compliance with approved procedures for 
test administration is not shown, it will be necessary for trial courts to determine whether 
foundational standards have been met by alternative means based on the evidence 
presented in each case.”  Id. at 343-44. 
 Later, in State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734 (Ct. App. 2011), the Court of Appeals 
explained “Charan does not stand for the proposition that an expert can merely testify 
that, because a breathalyzer did not reject test results, or rather allowed the test for 
continue, it worked properly and the test results are reliable.”  Healy, 151 Idaho at 737.  
The Healy Court held, “in order to meet the standard in Charan and allow breath test 
results into evidence when there is not strict compliance with the administrative 
procedures, the State needs to not only present an expert to testify, but that expert must 
also testify as to why procedural defects did not affect the reliability of test results in the 
particular case at issue.”  Id.   
 In Healy, it was uncontroverted there were procedural defects with the breath test 
instrument at issue, and the Court concluded the failure to follow the requirement of 
running a four-sample 0.20 calibration check after changing the instrument’s 0.08 
solution “necessitated the testimony of an expert that other safeguards in the 
[instrument] were still able to ensure the reliability of its results.”  See id. at 738.  The 
expert in Healy testified the 0.08 solution in use when the defendant took the breath test 
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had not expired and was within the acceptable concentration range, both as required by 
the procedures.  Id.  The expert testified, based on his experience with the breath test 
instrument, that the failure to run the four calibration checks would not have affected the 
test results in the case.  Id.  The Healy Court held, considering the additional 
safeguards for ensuring the validity of the 0.08 solution and the expert’s relevant 
experience, “the proper foundation was laid for admitting the test results at trial, even 
though the calibration procedures for the [instrument] were not precisely followed.”  Id. 
 Because the State stipulated that it failed to comply with the administrative 
procedures or SOPs for Mr. Longhofer’s breath test (see Tr., p.7, L.4 – p.8, L.9), under 
Healy and Charan it could only lay a foundation for admitting the breath test results 
using expert testimony.  Unlike the experts in Healy and Charan, the State’s expert 
here, Mr. Johnston, failed to provide testimony on why the procedural defects did not 
affect the reliability of the test results in this particular case.  Rather, Mr. Johnston, 
based on the simulator solution log, testified “[i]t appears the instrument has been—is 
underreporting.”  (Tr., p.25, Ls.12-13.)  On redirect examination, Mr. Johnston testified, 
“[o]ver time, this instrument’s calibration is losing sensitivity, and it’s underreporting.”  
(Tr., p.53, Ls.19-22.)  In other words, Mr. Johnston testified the breath test instrument 
gave inaccurate results.  Cf. State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 154 (N.J. 2008) (discussing 
how the phenomenon of “fuel cell drift” in an aging fuel cell, which reacts more slowly 
and with less intensity to the same amount of alcohol than when the fuel cell is new, 
would “result in an inaccurate underreporting of the percentage of alcohol in the test 
subject’s breath,” if the breath test device did not use a compensating algorithm). 
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 Mr. Johnston also testified “there’s no evidence to lead me to believe that the 
results given in the field are elevated,” and that he was confident to a reasonable 
scientific certainty that the breath measured was actually above the 0.08 level.  
(Tr., p.29, Ls.10-11, p.30, Ls.10-15.)  In its objection to the motion in limine, the State 
likewise argued Mr. Johnston would testify “that the instrument in question was trending 
low, and any deviation would have been to the Defendant’s benefit, producing test 
results lower than the actual Breath Alcohol Content.”  (R., p.38.)   
 However, Mr. Johnston’s testimony on Mr. Longhofer’s actual alcohol 
concentration was not relevant to why the procedural defects did not affect the reliability 
of the test results here.  As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “the actual alcohol 
concentration is irrelevant.”  State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, ___, 375 P.3d 279, 281 
(2016) (citing Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 153 Idaho 200, 204-05 (2012)).  The 
Jones Court held:  “Rather, it is the alcohol concentration as shown by the test result 
that is determinative of a violation.”  Id., 375 P.3d at 281 (citing Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 
204-05).  Thus, Mr. Johnston’s testimony on Mr. Longhofer’s actual alcohol 
concentration was not relevant to why the procedural defects did not affect the reliability 
of the test results. 
 Mr. Johnston testified that the breath test instrument here gave inaccurate 
results, and his testimony on Mr. Longhofer’s actual alcohol concentration was not 
relevant.  Thus, Mr. Johnson failed to provide testimony on why the procedural defects 
did not affect the reliability of the breath test results in this particular case, and thereby 
failed to meet the standards from Healy and Charan.  Because the State did not comply 
with the administrative procedures or SOPs, and the State’s expert failed to provide 
 17 
testimony on why the procedural defects did not affect the reliability of the test results, 
the State did not lay the necessary foundation for admitting the test results.  See 
Barber, 157 Idaho at 824; Healy, 151 Idaho at 737; Charan, 132 Idaho at 343-44.  The 
district court therefore abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Longhofer’s motion in 
limine to exclude the breath test results. 
 
D. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The District Court’s Denial Of The Motion In 
Limine Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
 
 Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  See 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).  “To hold an error as harmless, an appellate 
court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable 
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”  State v. 
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
 Here, the State will be unable to prove the district court’s denial of 
Mr. Longhofer’s motion in limine is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Mr. Longhofer 
conditioned his plea on reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of the 
motion in limine (e.g., R., p.97), indicating he would not have changed his plea to guilty 
had the district court properly excluded the breath test results.  Thus, the State will be 
unable to meet its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt there was no 
reasonable possibility the district court’s denial of the motion in limine did not contribute 
to the conviction.  See Sharp, 101 Idaho at 507. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Mr. Longhofer respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (second 
felony within fifteen years), reverse the district court’s order denying his motion in limine, 
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 3rd day of October, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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